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Abstract
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence to the e¤ect that strong patent rights
may complement competition-increasing product market reforms in inducing innova-
tion. First, we nd that the product market reform induced by the large-scale inter-
nal market reform of the European Union in 1992 enhanced innovation in industries
of countries where patent rights are strong, but not in industries of countries where
patent rights are weak. Second, the positive innovation response to the product market
reform is more pronounced in industries in which innovators rely more on patenting
than in other industries. The observed complementarity between patent protection and
product market competition can be rationalized using a Schumpeterian growth model
with step-by-step innovation. In such a model, better patent protection prolongs the
period over which the rm escaping competition by innovating, actually enjoys higher
monopoly rents from its technological upgrade.
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1 Introduction
Over the past two decades, the e¤ects of regulatory changes that strengthen patent protec-
tion have been investigated in numerous empirical studies, with hardly any study reporting
evidence of a positive average e¤ect on the level of innovation (Sakakibara and Branstetter,
2001, Lerner, 2002 and 2009, or Qian, 2007, among others). This led Josh Lerner to stat-
ing that the lack of a positive impact of strengthening of patent protection on innovation
is a puzzling result. It runs (..) against our intuition as economists that incentives a¤ect
behavior (...).(see Lerner, 2009, p. 347).
In this paper, we set out to study whether patent protection can foster innovation when
being complemented by product market competition. More specically, we investigate how
innovation responses to a competition-increasing product market reform depend upon the
strength of patent rights. The product market reform we consider was part of the large-
scale internal market reform of the European Union (EU) in 1992, named the Single Market
Program (SMP). The European Commission designed this policy initiative to enhance com-
petition, innovation and economic growth and implemented it at a time with signicant
variation in patent protection across European Countries. The product market reform cre-
ated exogenous variation in product market conditions across industries within countries,
across countries and across time. Positive average e¤ects of the reform on product market
competition have been widely documented (Badinger, 2007, Bottasso and Sembenelli 2001,
and Gri¢ th, Harrison and Simpson 2010, among others).
In our empirical analysis, we rst compare the innovation responses to the product mar-
ket reform across two country groups. The rst group covers the countries with strong patent
rights in our main sample of 13 manufacturing industries in 17 European countries between
1987 and 2003. These countries have had strong intellectual property rights (IPR) regimes
since the pre-sample period, 1980 until 1986, and are among the founder states of the Eu-
ropean Patent Organization (EPOrg). The second group covers the countries with weaker
patent rights before and during our observation period. The estimation results indicate that
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innovation responds positively to the competition-enhancing product market reform in in-
dustries that are located in countries with strong patent rights, but not so in industries of
countries with weaker patent rights.1 These ndings in turn are consistent with the view
that patent protection and product market competition may be complementary in induc-
ing innovation. A concern when comparing these e¤ects of the reform on innovation across
the two country groups are potential interactions between the product market reform and
country-specic factors other than the degree of patent protection. We address this concern
by investigating whether the reforms e¤ects vary systematically across di¤erent industry
groups within the country groups. We nd that the reforms e¤ect on innovative activity in
countries with strong patent rights is more pronounced in industries where innovators are
generally more prone to rely on patenting and are likely to value strong patent protection
more than in other industries,2 except for one industry where patent thickets and other
patent-related impediments to cumulative innovation are most likely to be prevalent (elec-
trical, medical and optical equipment, including computing machinery, radio, television, and
(tele)communication equipment, NACE 30-33).
Empirical results suggesting that patent protection and product market competition can
act as complementary inputs to innovation and growth, are at odds with what early endoge-
nous growth models would predict (e.g., Romer, 1990, and Aghion and Howitt, 1992). In
these models patent protection fosters innovation and growth as it enhances the rents from
innovation, whereas product market competition deters innovation and growth by reducing
these rents. Thus, patent protection is good for innovation for exactly the same reason that
renders competition bad for innovation.3 However, patent protection and product market
1To measure the intensity of the product market reform we use ex ante expectations of experts regarding
changes in product market conditions at the country-industry-year level (Buigues, Ilzkovitz and Lebrun,
1990). We nd similar results when using alternative measures of the product market reform intensity, of
patent protection and innovation (see Sections 4 and 5).
2To identify these industries in which patent relevance is high in general we use two alternative measures.
First, we classify industries according to the level of the patent intensity in the corresponding US industry in
the pre-sample period. Second, we build on US survey data provided by Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000).
3More recently, Boldrin and Levine (2008) have argued that patent protection is detrimental to innovation
because it blocks product market competition whereas competition is good for innovation because it allows
the greatest scope to those who can develop new ideas. Even though Boldrin and Levine (2008) depart here
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competition can become complementary forces in a Schumpeterian growth model with step-
by-step innovation. Why? Because in such a model a positive fraction of sectors involve
neck-and-neck rms, that is, rms that compete on an equal technological footing. Each
rms incentive to innovate depends on the di¤erence between its post-innovation rent and
its pre-innovation rent, and this di¤erence - the net innovation rent - is in turn a¤ected
by both, product market competition and patent protection. More specically, in a neck-
and-neck sector where rms make positive prots even if they do not innovate, tougher
product market competition will reduce this pre-innovation rent. It may also lower the
post-innovation rents but to a lower extent. Thus, overall, product market competition will
increase the net innovation rents in a neck-and-neck sector: this we refer to as the escape
competition e¤ect in Aghion, Harris, Howitt and Vickers (2001) and Aghion, Bloom, Blun-
dell, Gri¢ th and Howitt (2005). On the other hand, stronger patent protection will enhance
post-innovation rents to a larger extent than pre-innovation rents, especially when the latter
are bogged down by competition. Hence, product market competition and patent protection
can complement each other in inducing innovation.4
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it contributes to the literature
on competition and growth.5 Aghion et al. (2005) report empirical evidence of an inverted-U
relationship between product market competition and innovation for a panel of industries in
the United Kingdom (U.K.). Aghion, Blundell, Gri¢ th, Howitt and Prantl (2009) use panel
data on plants, establishments and rms to show that escape-entry e¤ects on the productivity
growth and patenting of incumbents in the U.K. vary with the technological development
from the early endogenous growth literature, they share the view that patent protection and competition
are counteracting (or mutually exclusive) forces: namely, whenever one is good for innovation the other is
detrimental to innovation. See also our discussion in Aghion, Howitt and Prantl (2013b).
4In Romer (1990) where innovations are made by outsiders who create a new variety, product market
competition reduces the post-innovation rent from innovation, which is equal to the net innovation rent,
and patent protection increases that rent. This is also the case in Aghion and Howitt (1992) where new
innovators leap-frog incumbent rms.
5See, in particular, Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2005), Acemoglu, Aghion and Zilibotti (2006),
Aghion and Howitt (2009), Acemoglu (2009), and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012). With regard to the re-
lated theoretical literature in industrial organization, we refer the reader, among others, to Tirole (1988),
Scotchmer (2004), Gilbert (2006), Vives (2008), and Schmutzler (2010, 2012).
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at the industry-level. Aghion, Burgess, Redding and Zilibotti (2008) study how the e¤ects
of an Indian product market deregulation on industry output vary across Indian states
with di¤erent labor market institutions. Focusing on the SMP, like we do,6 Bottasso and
Sembenelli (2001) and Badinger (2007) show that this product market intervention reduced
mark-ups in manufacturing industries. Gri¢ th et al. (2010) report that the SMP enhanced
product market competition which, in turn, led to an increase in R&D expenditures, using
panel data for manufacturing industries in OECD countries. None of these papers, however,
examines how the impact of the competition-increasing product market reform on innovation
may interact with the strength of patent protection.
Our work also contributes to the empirical literature on the e¤ects of intellectual property
rights (IPR), as well as IPR reforms, on the level of innovation.7 Sakakibara and Branstetter
(2001) investigate consequences of the Japanese patent law reform in 1988. The reform
introduced the option of multiple, (in)dependent claims per patent and, thus, broadened the
scope of Japanese patents. They nd no evidence of positive average reform e¤ects on R&D
spending or innovative output of Japanese rms. Branstetter, Fisman and Foley (2006)
investigate how the extent of technology transfers within United States (U.S.) multinational
rms responds to IPR reforms in their a¢ liateshost countries. What these papers do not
consider are potential interaction e¤ects between the patent law reform and product market
competition. Qian (2007) uses country-level panel data for the pharmaceutical industry
in OECD countries to show that introducing national patent protection does, on average,
not stimulate pharmaceutical innovation. In addition, she nds positive, often statistically
signicant coe¢ cients on interactions between patent protection and the country-level Fraser
Institute index of economic freedom.8 To the extent that this index can reect country-level
6In Aghion et al. (2005, 2009), the SMP provides the excluded instruments that are used in instrumental
variable and control function models explaining innovation or productivity growth.
7Moser (2005) addresses an important, but di¤erent question. She provides empirical evidence suggesting
that the existence of patent laws inuences the direction of technological progress, as well as the pattern of
comparative advantages across countries.
8This index is a composite measure which aggregates country-level proxies of the size of government,
access to money, regulation of credit, labor and business, legal structure and property rights, and freedom
to trade.
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freedom to compete and trade, Qians nding for the pharmaceutical industry provides a rst
hint towards the complementarity we are interested in. Against this background, we focus on
identifying interaction e¤ects between product market competition and patent protection,
exploiting the fact that the SMP product market reform created exogenous variation in
product market conditions across industries within countries, across countries, and across
time.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we use a simple Schum-
peterian growth model to explain why product market competition and patent protection
can be complementary in fostering innovation. We present the empirical approach in Section
3 and explain the data in Section 4. The empirical results are described and discussed in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Why can patent protection and product market com-
petition be complementary?
In this section we use the simple Schumpeterian growth model with step-by-step innovation
of Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al. (2005), or Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2014) to explain
why patent protection and product market competition may be complementary in inducing
innovation. The novelty with respect to the papers above is that here we focus on the
combined e¤ect of these two policy instruments on innovation.
2.1 Basic setup
Time is continuous and the economy is populated by a continuum of individuals. The rep-
resentative household consumes Ct at date t, has logarithmic instantaneous utility U (Ct) =
lnCt, discounts the future at rate  > 0, has inelastic labor supply, and holds a balanced
portfolio of the shares of all rms. The economy is closed, all costs are in terms of labor
units, and the households consumption is equal to the total output of the nal good, that is
Ct = Yt. The Euler equation is gt = rt    with g denoting the growth rate of consumption,
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and thus output, and r denoting the interest rate.
The unique nal good is produced under perfect competition from a continuum of inter-
mediate inputs, according to the logarithmic production function:
lnYt =
Z 1
0
ln yjtdj: (1)
We introduce competition by assuming that each sector j is duopolistic with respect to
production and research activities. We denote the two duopolists in sector j as Aj and Bj and
assume that yj is the sum of the intermediate goods produced by the two duopolists in sector
j, that is yj = yAj+yBj. The logarithmic structure of the production function in equation (1)
implies that nal good producers spend the same amount on each basket yj in equilibrium
at any time, and we choose the numeraire so that this amount is normalized to one. Thus,
a nal good producer chooses each yAj and yBj to maximize yAj + yBj subject to the budget
constraint pAjyAj + pBjyBj = 1 where pAj and pBj are the intermediate good prices. The
entire unit expenditure will be devoted to the least expensive of the two intermediate goods.
2.2 Technology and innovation
Following Aghion and Howitt (2009), we assume that each rm takes the wage rate as given
and produces using labor as the only input according to the following linear production
function,
yit = Aitlit with i 2 fA;Bg
and ljt denoting employed labor. Assume Ai = ki where ki is the technology level of
duopoly rm i in sector j and  > 1 is the parameter that measures the size of a leading-
edge innovation: Equivalently, it takes  ki units of labor for rm i to produce one unit of
output. Thus, the unit cost of production is simply ci = w ki ; which is independent of the
quantity produced. Thus, a sector j is fully characterized by a pair of integers (kj;mj) where
kj is the technology of the leader who lies one step ahead of its competitor (the laggard or
follower rm) and mj is the technological gap between the leader and the laggard.9
9The above logarithmic nal good technology together with the linear production cost structure for
intermediate goods implies that the equilibrium prot ows of the leader and the follower in sector j depend
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For simplicity, we assume that neither rm can get more than one technological level
ahead of the other, that is mj  1. Thus, at any point in time, there will be two kinds of
intermediate sectors in the economy: (i) leveled or neck-and-neck sectors, where both rms
are at the same technological level, and (ii) unleveled sectors, where the leader lies one step
ahead of the laggard.10
Now, we specify the step-by-step innovation technology. We assume that a leader moves
one technological step ahead at a rate z by spending the R&D cost  (z) = z2=2 in units of
labor. We call z the innovation rate or R&D intensity of the rm. We assume that a laggard
can move one step ahead with probability h, even if it spends nothing on R&D, by copying
the leaders technology. Accordingly, z2=2 is the R&D cost of a follower rm moving ahead
with probability z + h. As in Aghion et al. (2001), Aghion et al (2005), or Acemoglu and
Akcigit (2012), h measures the ease of imitation, and as Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) we
use it as an inverse measure of patent protection.11
We let z0 denote the R&D intensity of a rm in a leveled sector, and z 1 the R&D intensity
of a laggard in an unleveled sector. The R&D intensity of the leader in an unleveled industry,
denoted by z1, is equal to zero (z1 = 0) due to the above assumption of automatic catch-up.
2.3 Equilibrium prots and product market competition
As shown in Aghion and Howitt (2009), the equilibrium prot of a leader in an unleveled
sector is
1 = 1  1

only on the technological gap mj between the two rms (see below for the case where mj  1).
10Aghion et al. (2001) and Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012) analyze the more general case where there is no
limit to how far ahead the leader can get.
11As patent systems usually feature multiple policy instruments, the patent literature has developed al-
ternative modeling approaches. Among others, Cozzi (2001) models intellectual appropriability as the prob-
ability that inventors are able to prevent their innovations from being stolen by imitators, Li (2001) models
patent breadth as the market power of rms in a quality-ladder model, Chu, Cozzi and Galli (2012) focus on
blocking patents as the share of prots that incumbents are able to extract from entrants and ODonoghue
and Zweimuller (2004) model the patentability requirement as the minimum quality step size in order for an
innovation to be patentable.
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and the laggard will be priced out of the market such that
 1 = 0.
Consider now a leveled (neck-and-neck) sector. If the two rms engaged in open price
competition with no collusion, the equilibrium price would fall to the unit cost of each rm,
resulting in zero prot. If, instead, the two rms colluded so e¤ectively as to maximize their
joint prots and shared the proceeds, then they would together act like the leader in an
unleveled sector,12 each earning a prot equal to 1=2.
Accordingly, the two rms in a leveled sector have an incentive to collude and we model
the degree of product market competition inversely by the degree to which the rms are able
to collude, denoting it by .13 Specically, we assume that the prot of a neck-and-neck
rm is
0 = (1 )1 with 1=2    1.
Note that  is also the incremental prot of an innovator in a leveled sector, normalized by
a leaders prot 1.
We next analyze how the equilibrium R&D intensities z0 and z 1 of neck-and-neck rms
and laggards, respectively, and consequently the aggregate innovation rate, vary with our
measure of product market competition  and the measure of patent protection and why
there might be complementarity between an increase in  and a reduction in h in fostering
innovation and growth.
2.4 Patent protection and product market competition
Let Vm (resp. V m) denote the normalized steady-state value of currently being a leader
(resp. a laggard) in an industry with technological gap m; and let ! = w=Y denote the
12Here we assume that any third rm could compete using the previous best technology, just like a laggard
in an unleveled sector.
13In an unleveled sector, rms do not collude as the leader has no interest in sharing her prot.
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normalized steady-state wage rate: We have the following Bellman equations:14
V0 = max
z0

0 + z0(V 1   V0) + z0(V1   V0)  !z20=2
	
(2)
V 1 = max
z 1

 1 + (z 1 + h)(V0   V 1)  !z2 1=2
	
(3)
V1 = 1 + (z 1 + h)(V0   V1) (4)
where z0 denotes the R&D intensity of the competitor in a neck-and-neck industry. In (4),
we used z1 = 0 as the leader in an unleveled sector does not invest in R&D in equilibrium.
Note also that we focus on a symmetric equilibrium in Markov strategies where z0 = z0.
The growth-adjusted annuity value V0 of currently being neck-and-neck is equal to the
current prot ow 0 plus the expected capital gain z0(V1   V0) of acquiring a lead over
the rival by innovating plus the expected capital loss z0(V 1   V0) if the rival innovates
and thereby becomes the leader, minus the R&D cost !z20=2. The annuity value V 1 of
currently being a laggard in an unleveled industry is equal to the current prot ow  1
plus the expected capital gain (z 1+ h)(V0  V 1) of catching up with the leader, minus the
R&D cost !z2 1=2. Finally, the annuity value V1 of being a leader in an unleveled industry
is equal to the current prot ow 1 plus the expected capital loss (z 1 + h)(V0   V1) if the
leader is being caught up by the laggard.
Given that z0 maximizes (2) and z 1 maximizes (3), we have the rst-order conditions:
!z0 = V1   V0 (5)
!z 1 = V0   V 1: (6)
In Aghion, Harris and Vickers (1997) the model is closed by a labor market clearing
equation that determines ! as a function of the aggregate demand for R&D plus the aggregate
demand for manufacturing labor. Here, we ignore that equation for simplicity and take the
wage rate ! as given, normalizing it at ! = 1:
14Here we use (i) that the left-hand-side is equal to rV0  _V0; (ii) that _V0 = gV0 holds on a balanced growth
path; and (iii) that the Euler equation is g = r   .
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Using (5) and (6) to eliminate the V s from the system of equations (2)-(4), we end up
with the system of the following two equations in the unknown R&D intensities z0 and z 1:
z20=2 + (+ h)z0   (1   0) = 0 (7)
z2 1=2 + (+ z0 + h)z 1   (0    1)  z20=2 = 0 (8)
These equations solve recursively for unique positive values of z0 and z 1; and in particular
we get
z0 =
21
+ h+
p
(+ h)2 + 21
:
We rst get the result that an increase in  increases the innovation intensity z0 of a
neck-and-neck rm. This is the escape competition e¤ect. Moreover, this e¤ect is decreasing
with h as @z0
@@h
< 0. In other words, weaker patent protection reduces the magnitude of the
escape competition e¤ect. Hence, patent protection and product market competition are
complementary in enhancing innovation incentives in neck-and-neck rm.
Plugging z0() into (8), we can then look at the e¤ect of an increase in competition  on
the innovation intensity z 1 of a laggard. This e¤ect is ambiguous in general: in particular,
for very high , the e¤ect is negative, since then z 1 varies like
0    1 = (1 )1:
In this case the laggard is very impatient and thus looks at its short-term net prot ow
if it catches up with the leader, which in turn decreases when competition increases. This
is the Schumpeterian e¤ect. However, for low values of ; this e¤ect is counteracted by an
anticipated escape competition e¤ect.
Overall, an increase in product market competition will have an ambiguous e¤ect on
aggregate innovation and growth. It induces more intense innovation and faster productivity
growth in currently neck-an-neck sectors and faster or slower growth in currently unleveled
sectors. The overall e¤ect on growth will depend upon  and also the (steady-state) fraction
of leveled versus unleveled sectors. This steady-state fraction is itself endogenous, since it
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depends on equilibrium R&D intensities in both types of sectors. But what we can show is
that in the case where  is su¢ ciently small, the escape competition and anticipated escape
competition e¤ects will dominate the Schumpeterian e¤ect, so that the overall innovation
rate I will satisfy:
@I
@
> 0:
But in addition, and this is the new prediction we put forward in this section:
@2I
@@h
< 0:
It is this possibility of a complementary e¤ect of patent protection and product market
competition which we proceed to test in the following sections.
3 Empirical modeling
Our empirical approach is designed to identify heterogeneity in the e¤ect of a competition-
increasing product market reform on innovation, depending on the strength of patent rights.
The product market reform we focus on was part of the large-scale internal market reform of
the European Union (EU) in 1992, named the Single Market Program (SMP). The reform
was designed by the European Commission to enhance competition, innovation and economic
growth. The e¤ects of the reform on product market conditions were ex ante expected to
vary across industries, countries and time, and the reform was repeatedly reported to reduce
mark-ups and to increase product market competition (see Section 4 and Appendix B for
details).
We proceed in two steps, using panel data for 13 industries in 17 European countries
between 1987 and 2003. In the rst step, we compare the e¤ect of the product market reform
on innovation across two country-industry groups: 1) all industries in countries with strong
patent rights in the pre-sample period, 1980 to 1986, and throughout the sample period; 2)
all industries in countries with weaker patent rights (see also Section 4 and Appendix B).
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We estimate the following equation, as well as related variants:
ycit = 1Rcit G(P strongc; ps ) + 2Rcit G(P weakc; ps ) + Xcit + ct + it + ucit; (9)
where the explained variable ycit measures innovation. Our main measure of innovation is
R&D intensity, dened as R&D expenditures over value added. In addition, we use real
R&D expenditures and a count of patents. Countries are indexed by c, industries by i, time
by t, and ps indicates the pre-sample period. The main explanatory variable Rcit measures
the intensity of the product market reform. This variable is set to zero in all years before the
implementation of the SMP. From 1992 onwards, it takes values between zero and one, with a
higher value indicating that, ex ante, experts were expecting the respective country-industry
unit to be a¤ected more by the SMP than other country-industries. We interact the reform
intensity with G(P strongc; ps ), a time-invariant indicator for all industries in the country group
where patent rights are strong since the pre-sample period. We also interact the reform
intensity with G(P weakc; ps ), the corresponding indicator for all industries in the country group
with weaker patent rights since the pre-sample period. These indicators are constructed
from information on patent law reforms and related regulation.
Country-year xed e¤ects, ct, are included to capture unobserved factors which may
trigger country-specic trends of innovation over time. Macroeconomic uctuations induced
by changes to the European Exchange Rate Mechanism at the beginning of the 1990s are
among such factors. Industry-year xed e¤ects, it, are used to pick up unobserved factors,
like arbitrary drastic innovation, that can induce industry-specic trends over time. The
vector Xcit captures further covariates. These include, in particular, a measure of the initial
innovative potential of country-industries, as well as measures of their initial capital intensity
or initial exposure to competition at the level of the EU internal market. The error term
is denoted by ucit. We cluster standard errors at the country-industry level to allow for
unrestricted correlation between annual observations within the same country-industry.
Our main interest in equation (9) is on the coe¢ cients of the two product market reform
terms, 1 and 2. If patent protection is to reinforce the positive e¤ect of a competition-
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increasing product market reform on innovation, then the estimate of 1 should be positive
and larger than the one of 2. In the preferred variant of the model specication in equation
(9), the coe¢ cients 1 and 2 are identied from data variation across country-industries
and across time within country-industries. We also identify the coe¢ cients of interest from
alternative sources of data variation, for example, by varying the set of xed e¤ects. In
addition, we use alternative measures of the product market reform and of the patenting-
related variables. The estimation results are provided in Section 5.2.
In the second step of our empirical analysis, we address the concern that the estimates
of 1 and 2, and the extent to which these di¤er across the two country-industry groups in
equation (9), could be inuenced by interactions of the reform with country-specic factors
other than the patent protection regime.15 Modifying our initial identication strategy,
we study as well whether the response of innovation to the product market reform varies
systematically across the industries within these country-industry groups.16 We single out
industries where, in general, innovators tend to rely strongly on patenting and, thus, should
value patent protection highly. In line with our main theoretical prediction, innovation in
these industries in countries with strong patent rights should respond more positively to a
competition-increasing reform than innovation in other industries. We refer to the former
industries as industries with higher patent relevance, denote patent relevance by IUS; i; ps and
proxy it in two alternative ways. First, we classify each industry i according to the level
of the patent intensity in the corresponding US industry in the pre-sample period, 1980 to
1986. Second, we build on Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) who use survey responses of
R&D unit or laboratory managers to classify US industries according to the importance of
patenting in appropriating returns to invention in the years 1991 to 1993 (see also Section 4
and Appendix B).
15This concern may be relevant despite the variation of the reform intensity across industries within
countries, not only across countries and across time, and despite the control for country-year xed e¤ects.
16See Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) and Branstetter et al. (2006), among others, for similar ap-
proaches.
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We consider the following estimation equation, as well as related variants:
ycit = 11Rcit G(P strongc; ps ; I >medianUS; i; ps ) + 12Rcit G(P strongc; ps ; I medianUS; i; ps ) (8)
+ 21Rcit G(P weakc; ps ; I >medianUS; i; ps ) + 22Rcit G(P weakc; ps ; I medianUS; i; ps )
+ Xcit + Gci + ct + it + ucit;
where we estimate the innovation response to the product market reform separately for
four country-industry groups. The dummy variable G(P strongc; ps ; I
>median
US; i; ps ) indicates the group
of industries with high patent relevance in countries with strong patent rights. This group
covers the industries where innovators rely strongly on patenting, and where therefore patent
protection should be more relevant, compared to the industry with median patent relevance.
The dummy variable G(P strongc; ps ; I
median
US; i; ps ) indicates the complementing group of industries
with low patent relevance in countries with strong patent rights. For countries with weaker
patent rights we proceed analogously, constructing the indicators G(P weakc; ps ; I
>median
US; i; ps ) and
G(P weakc; ps ; I
median
US; i; ps ). To capture xed country-industry group e¤ects, we include the vector
of the group indicators, Gci.
The coe¢ cients of main interest in equation (8) are 11 and 12. If patent protection is to
enhance the positive e¤ect of a competition-increasing product market reform on innovation,
and the more so in industries where patent protection is more relevant, then the estimate
of 11 should be positive and larger than that of 12. In addition, the coe¢ cient estimates
for industries in countries with strong patent rights, 11 and 12, should be larger than
the corresponding estimates for industries in countries with weaker patent rights, 21 and
22, and the di¤erence 11  12 should be larger than 21  22. We provide the estimation
results in Section 5.2, along with the results for model specications where the reform e¤ect is
allowed to vary more exibly along the distribution of the patent relevance measure, IUS; i; ps.
In the nal part of our empirical analysis, we extend our model specication to allow
for interactions of the product market reform with country- and industry-specic nancial
factors, among others.
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4 Data
For our main sample we combine data from several sources into a panel dataset covering 13
industries across 17 European countries between 1987 and 2003. The majority of countries,
11 out of the 17 countries for which we have the relevant data, participated in the European
Single Market Program in 1992, as shown in Table 1.17 The other six European countries
include Finland and Sweden that joined the EU, and the SMP, in 1995. Among the 13 indus-
tries are nine two-digit industries and four more aggregate industries, all in manufacturing
(see Table 2).18 In section 5.3, we also use alternative samples.
Next, we briey introduce our main variables. Descriptive statistics are provided in Table
A-1, further details, also on additional variables, are provided in Appendix B.
Innovation
Our main measure of innovation is R&D intensity, dened as nominal R&D expenditures
over nominal value added. To construct this variable, we use country-industry-year level
data on research and development expenditures for the business enterprise sector from the
OECD ANBERD database, edition 2011, and data on value added from the EU KLEMS
database, edition 2008 (see also Appendix B.1). We also use real R&D expenditures, that
is R&D expenditures in US dollar purchasing power parities at year 2000 prices (in billion),
and a count of patents taken out per country-industry-year at the US Patent and Trademark
O¢ ce. The count of patents is part of the EU KLEMS 2008 database and constructed from
the NBER patent database with patents granted by the US Patent and Trademark O¢ ce
(see also Appendix B.2 and Hall, Ja¤e and Trajtenberg, 2001).19
We capture the initial innovation potential of country-industries by a continuous measure
of the patent-based knowledge stock built up until 1986, the end of the pre-sample period.
17All of these 11 countries had entered the European Union much earlier, at the latest in 1986. For the
twelfth EU member state in 1992, Luxembourg, data on R&D expenditures are missing. Germany is part
of our main estimation sample from 1991 onwards, these being the years after German reunication.
18We grouped up to four two-digit industries together if the underlying raw data required us to do so.
Industries are classied according to the European NACE classication (version 1993, revision 1).
19Using data on US patents is advantageous in our context as low-value inventions are less likely to be
patented abroad.
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Patent rights
To capture the strength of patent protection, we separate between countries with strong
patent rights and those with weaker patent rights. To do so, we use data on patent law
reforms, as well as related regulation, and focus on a time period with signicant variation
in patent protection across European Countries (see also Appendix B.3). One group of
countries in our dataset had strong patent protection already in the pre-sample period, 1980
to 1986, and also throughout the whole sample period, 1987 to 2003. The group covers
seven EU member states that implemented the SMP in 1992 (Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom), Sweden which joined the EU in 1995, and
the United States in an extended estimation sample. All other sampled countries form the
group with weaker patent protection. Among these are: 1) four EU member states that
implemented the SMP in 1992 (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain), Finland which joined the
EU in 1995, and four European countries outside the EU during our observation period
(Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic).
All European countries in our group with strong patent rights, except for Denmark and
Italy, were among the states that set up the European Patent Organisation (EPOrg) in Octo-
ber 1977.20 The countries in our group with weaker patent rights joined the EPOrg between
October 1986 and March 2004 (EPOrg, 2010) and none of these countries completed the
required reforms for a strong patent protection regime before 1992 (Branstetter et al. 2006,
Qian 2007, and World Intellectual Property Organization 2012, among others). Our clas-
sication is consistent with those used in Branstetter et al. (2006), Maskus and Penubarti
(1995) or Qian (2007). In addition, we compare our time-invariant, pre-sample patent protec-
tion measure to the time-varying index of patent protection that was developed by Ginarte
and Park (1997), and updated by Park (2008). The index is available for every fth year
20Italy has been a contracting state since 1978, and Denmark since 1990. The EPOrg is the intergovern-
mental organization that was created for granting patents in Europe under the European Patent Convention
of 1973; the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO) acts as the executive body and the rst patent applications
were led in 1978. A European patent is a set of essentially independent patents with national enforcement,
national revocation, and central revocation or narrowing via two alternative unied, post-grant procedures.
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between 1960 and 2005, it takes country-specic values between zero and ve, with higher
values indicating patent laws with stronger IPR. In 1985, the countries with strong patent
rights have Ginarte-Park index values of about 3.5 or more, and the average is 3.9.21 In
2000, the index values of these countries are at least 4.5. All countries with weaker patent
rights have much lower index values (below 2.8) in 1985, except for Finland or countries
with missing index values. The average is 2.5. In 2000 only two such countries, Ireland and
Finland, scored above 4.5. Overall, the index change over time and the index values for 2000
reect that strong international harmonization of patent systems has been reached at the
end of our observation period.
In the second part of the empirical analysis, when estimating the innovation response to
the product market reform separately for di¤erent patenting-related country-industry groups,
we start with two group of industries. First, we single out the industries with high patent
relevance where, in general, innovators tend to rely more on patenting, and where therefore
patent protection should be more relevant, compared to an industry with median patent
relevance. Second, we form the complementing industry group with low patent relevance.
To construct the industry groups we need a measure of patent relevance, IUS; i; ps.22 Our
main proxy ranks each industry i according to the level of the patent intensity in the corre-
sponding US industry in the pre-sample period, 1980 to 1986. The alternative measure builds
on Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) who use survey data to classify US industries according
to the importance of patenting in appropriating returns to invention. In the survey, about
1,100 R&D unit or laboratory managers reported per manufacturing industry the share of
their product and process innovations in the years 1991 to 1993 for which patenting had
been e¤ective in protecting returns to invention, realized via commercialization or licensing.
In more exible model specications, we consider alternative sets of three instead of two
industry groups, respectively with high, low and medium patent relevance at or above the
21Columns 3 to 6 in Table 1 indicate the Ginarte-Park index values for the sampled countries in 1985,
1990, 1995 and 2000.
22Both these measures are based on data for U.S. industries as the U.S. is the technology leader in most
industries and it is not included in our main sample.
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75th percentile of the chosen relevance measure, below the 25th percentile, and in between.
The three-group ranking based on the pre-sample US patent intensity data is shown in
column 3 of Table 2 for each sampled industry. Column 4 provides the ranking building on
the survey data of Cohen, Nelsen and Walsh (2000).23
Product market reform
The considered product market reform is part of the large-scale internal market reform
of the European Union (EU) in 1992, named the Single Market Program (SMP). With the
SMP, the EU aimed at bringing down internal barriers to the free movement of products
and production factors within the EU in order to foster competition, innovation and eco-
nomic growth. Main components include changes to national legislation meant to harmonize
technical product standards within the EU; removals of national requirements and other
non-tari¤ barriers that enable rms to segment the internal market and limit competition;
and the reduction of public sector discrimination in favor of national rms, for example due
to mandatory EU-wide tendering for high-value procurement. Designed by the European
Commission, and therefore a supra-national institutional body, the product market reform
was o¢ cially implemented by EU member countries in 1992, a time with signicant variation
in patent protection across countries (see also Table 1). All the 11 initital SMP countries
in our main sample had entered the EU much earlier, at the latest in 1986. Previous em-
pirical studies support the view that product market competition has increased in response
to the product market reform, and often so from initially low levels of competition(e.g., see
Badinger 2007, Bottasso and Sembenelli 2001 or Gri¢ th et al. 2010).
For constructing product market reform measures we use the European Commission
report by Buigues et al. (1990) which provides a common list of manufacturing industries
that were ex ante expected to be a¤ected by the product market reform. Country-specic
additions to and removals from the common industry list are also reported.24 The information
23See Appendix B.3 for details.
24These additions and removals reect recommendations of experts, who were asked whether they expected
the reform to change the product market conditions in a specic country-industry di¤erently than in the
corresponding average industry.
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in Buigues et al. (1990) allows us to construct reform measures that vary not only across time,
but also across industries and SMP countries. This data variation is useful for identifying
the reform impact from confounding inuences. Further data variation is also available as
our main data set covers non-SMP countries as well, not only SMP countries.
To generate ourmain measure of the product market reform we aggregate the information
from the common list of Buigues et al. (1990), as well as the country-specic additions
and removals. For each of the 13 industries in each of the SMP countries in our data
set, the measure is set equal to zero in all years before the implementation of the product
market reform. From 1992 onwards, it is equal to the share of the non-weighted four-
digit industry classes per country-industry that were ex ante expected to be a¤ected by the
product market reform.25 For an alternative measure of the product market reform we use
the employment shares that are reported in Buigues et al. (1990) to calculate the share of the
employment-weighted three-digit industry classes per country-industry that were expected
to be a¤ected.26 Given that many relevant employment shares are missing, the alternative
measure can only be calculated for a smaller sample, not including Sweden and Finland
(see Appendix B.4 for details). Our main ndings are, however, robust towards using the
alternative measure (see Section 5).
In column 5 of Table 2, we report the product market reform intensity in 1992 for all
13 industries in our data set, averaging the main reform measure across the 11 initial SMP
countries in our main sample. The industries that were expected to be a¤ected least are
coke, rened petroleum, and nuclear fuel (23), basic metals (27), and food, beverages,
and tobacco (15/16). Those that were expected to be a¤ected most are motor vehicles, trail-
ers, and semi-trailers (34), electrical and optical equipment (30-33), chemicals including
pharmaceuticals (24), and general and special purpose machinery (29).
25For country-industries in Sweden or Finland, the main SMP measure is, from 1995 onwards, equal to
the ex-ante expected share of the a¤ected industry classes on the common list of Buigues et al. (1990) per
country-industry, and zero otherwise.
26See Gri¢ th et al. (2010) for a similar approach.
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5 Empirical results
5.1 Baseline results
We start by separately estimating the average e¤ect of the competition-increasing product
market reform which is part of the European Single Market Program and the average e¤ect
of patent protection on innovation. This prepares the ground for analyzing innovation e¤ects
of the interaction between the two factors. We report OLS estimation results in Table 3 for
the main sample, an unbalanced panel of 2,761 observations on 13 manufacturing industries
in 17 European countries between 1987 and 2003. All model specications include country,
industry and year indicators to capture country, industry and year e¤ects. Standard errors
are robust and clustered at the country-industry level to allow for unrestricted correlation
between annual observations within the same country-industry.
Our rst nding is that of a positive average e¤ect of the product market reform intensity
on R&D intensity in column 1 of Table 3.27 The coe¢ cient estimate indicates that enhancing
the reform intensity by one standard deviation (0.3076) increases R&D intensity by 0.0108
(=0.0352*0.3076).28 This represents about 23 percent of the mean value of R&D intensity
in the estimation sample (0.0464), a reasonable e¤ect size. Such an average e¤ect estimate is
consistent with an escape competition e¤ect and it ts with the empirical results of Gri¢ th
et al. (2010).29
Our second nding is a negative one: we nd no e¤ect of patent protection on R&D
intensity. In column 2, we show the coe¢ cient estimate on a time-varying indicator which
equals one in the years once a country completed its reforms preparing the ground for a
strong patent protection regime, and zero otherwise. The estimate is small, positive and not
signicantly di¤erent from zero.30 This is consistent with previous empirical evidence, in
27See Section 4 for the denitions of the variables.
28See Appendix Table A-1 for the descriptive statistics.
29Gri¢ th et al. (2010) use data on a similar set of industries in a di¤erent set of countries (Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Netherlands, United Kingdom, United States).
30Using the patent protection index provided by Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008) yields a very
similar coe¢ cient estimate.
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particular by Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001) for the manufacturing sector in Japan or
by Qian (2007) for the pharmaceutical industry in OECD countries.
Both these ndings remain robust in a model specication where we include both terms,
the linear term for the competition-increasing product market reform as well as the linear
term for patent protection (see column 3).
5.2 Main results
Our main focus in this paper is on the response of innovation to the interplay between the
competition-enhancing product market reform and patent protection. As shown in Figure
1, our raw data directly hints at heterogeneity in the response to the reform, depending
on the strength of patent rights. The left-hand graph refers to industries in countries with
strong patent rights since the pre-sample period up to 1986, the right-hand graph refers to
industries in countries with weaker patent rights. The vertical axes indicate R&D intensity,
the horizontal axes indicate the product market reform intensity. Circles represent all the
country-industry-year data points between the fth and the ninety-fth percentile of the
R&D intensity distribution in the main sample. The regression line for industries in countries
with strong patent rights has a more positive slope than the corresponding line for industries
in countries with weaker patent rights.31 Overall, the raw data pattern is consistent with the
view that innovation responds more strongly to the competition-enhancing reform if patent
rights are stronger.
Next, we estimate equation (9) of Section 3. The estimation results in Table 4 indicate a
positive e¤ect of the product market reform intensity, Rcit, on R&D intensity for industries
in countries with strong patent rights since the pre-sample period. For industries in coun-
tries with weaker patent rights we nd no such e¤ect. These ndings are stable across the
following variants of the estimation equation: a) the one in column 1 of Table 4 with two
interaction terms, Rcit G(P (Protection)strongc; ps ) and Rcit G(Pweakc; ps ), as well as controls for
31Each of these regression lines is specic to the country-industry group used in the respective graph,
indicating a linear prediction from the group-specic linear regression of R&D intensity on the product
market reform intensity as the sole explanatory variable.
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country, industry, and year xed e¤ects; b) the one in column 2 with the interaction term
Rcit G(Protection (P )strongc ), the level term Rcit, controls for country-year xed e¤ects and
for industry-year xed e¤ects;32 c) and, nally, the one in column 3 where we added the
knowledge stock of country-industries in 1986 as explanatory variable.
Our ndings are also robust to various changes in the way we measure our main explana-
tory variables. First, we replace our main measure of the product market reform intensity
by the alternative measure which, from 1992 onwards, is equal to the share of employment-
weighted three-digit industry classes per country-industry that were ex ante expected to be
a¤ected by the reform.33 The estimation results are shown in column 4 of Table 4, and they
are very similar to those in column 3. Second, we replace our preferred time-invariant, pre-
sample measure of patent protection by the time-varying, contemporaneous Ginarte-Park
index (PGPct ). Column 5 of Table 4 provides the respective OLS estimates. As the contem-
poraneous index may reect regulatory changes that are endogenous to innovation during
our sample period, we also implement an instrumental variable approach. Our excluded
instrument is the interaction of the country-specic pre-sample indicator of strong patent
rights and the product market reform intensity.34 The second stage estimates on the two
product market reform terms in column 6 indicate that the reform e¤ect on R&D intensity
increases with patent protection and is positive for all index values above 3.7. About 65%
of all sample observations in 1992 have larger index values than 3.7 and in later years the
percentage is even higher.35
All our estimation results in Table 4 are in line with the view that the competition-
32The coe¢ cient on the interaction term, Rcit G(Pstrongc; ps ), indicates now how the reform e¤ect for the
industries in countries with strong patent rights deviates from the reform e¤ect for the industries in countries
with weaker patent rights. The latter is captured by the coe¢ cient on the level term, Rcit.
33For the main measure we use instead the share of the unweighted four-digit industry classes per country-
industry that were expected to be a¤ected by the reform. The alternative measure is available for a smaller
sample than the main measure.
34The coe¢ cient estimate (s.e.) on the excluded instrument in the rst stage equation is 0.7336***
(0.1254). The test statistic for the F-test on the irrelevance of the excluded instrument takes a value of
34.24 and we reject the null hypothesis.
35The weak identication test is not indicating a weak instrument problem. See the Kleibergen-Paap Wald
statistic at the bottom of column 6 in Table 4, Baum, Scha¤er, and Stillman, 2007, Kleibergen and Paap,
2006, and Stock and Yogo, 2005.
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enhancing product market reform is complemented by patent protection in inducing inno-
vation. A potential concern with these results is that the estimates of the product market
reform e¤ect for industries in countries with strong patent rights, and their deviation from
the estimates for industries in countries with weaker patent rights, could be inuenced by
interactions between the product market reform and country-specic factors other than the
patent protection regime. This concern may be relevant despite the variation of the reform
intensity across industries within countries, not only across countries and across time, and
despite the control for country-year xed e¤ects.
Accordingly, we turn to investigating whether, in particular, the positive reform e¤ect
which refers to all industries within countries with strong patent rights varies systematically
across industries. As argued in Section 3, we expect that e¤ect to be stronger in industries
where innovators rely more on patenting and where, therefore, patent protection should
be valued more than in other industries. We refer to these industries as industries with
higher patent relevance and use the two alternative proxies for patent relevance introduced
in Section 3.
Column 1 of Table 5 provides the estimation results for a variant of equation (8) in Section
3, allowing for di¤erent innovation responses to the competition-increasing product market
reform across three country-industry groups. The rst group, G(P strongc; ps ; I
>median
US; i; ps ), covers
the industries with above median patent relevance in countries with strong patent rights, and
the second group, G(P strongc; ps ; I
median
US; i; ps ), complements with the remaining industries in the
same group of countries. To form these country-industry groups, as well as those in columns
2 to 4, we use the main measure of patent relevance, ranking each industry i according to
the level of the patent intensity in the corresponding US industry in the pre-sample period,
1980 to 1986. Column 1 shows for each of these two groups a signicantly higher reform
e¤ect on R&D intensity than for the third group, covering all industries in countries with
weaker patent rights. The reform e¤ect for the third group is reected by the estimate of the
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coe¢ cient on the Rcit-term.36 In addition, we nd positive reform e¤ects in both groups of
countries with strong patent rights37 and, most importantly, we nd a higher reform e¤ect for
the group with above median patent relevance than for the one with lower patent relevance.38
In column 2, we consider a model specication which allows for di¤erential reform ef-
fects on R&D intensity across three industry groups in countries with strong patent rights,
respectively with a level of patent relevance at or above the 75th percentile of the relevance
measure, below the 25th percentile, and in between.39 We nd, in countries with strong
patent rights, a positive e¤ect of the competition-increasing product market reform on R&D
intensity in the industries with high level of patent relevance, as well as in the industries
with an intermediate level. We also observe that the responses in these two country-industry
groups are stronger than those in other groups.40 For the group of all industries in countries
with weaker patent rights, we estimate again the average reform e¤ect and nd a small and
insignicant estimate.41 Summing up, we nd further evidence that is in line with comple-
mentarity between the competition-increasing product market reform and patent protection:
R&D intensity responds more strongly to the reform in country-industries where patent rights
are strong since the pre-sample period until 1986 and where patent relevance takes high or
36Estimating the average reform e¤ect for all industries in countries with weaker patent rights is appropriate
according to the results for the more exible model specication in column 1 in Appendix Table A-3. The
coe¢ cient estimates on the two relevant groups, G(P weakc; ps ; I
>median
US; i; ps ) and G(P
weak
c; ps ; I
median
US; i; ps ) in equation
(8), lead to coe¢ cient estimates which are small, insignicant, and not signicantly di¤erent from each other.
The F-test statistic for the null hypothesis "N0: 21   22 = 0" is 0.22 (p-value: 0.6402).
37The F-test statistic relevant to the country-industry group with strong patent rights and above median
patent relevance is 17.93 (p-value: 0.0000). The other relevant F-test statistic is 8.85 (p-value: 0.0033).
38The F-test statistic for the test of the null hypothesis, "N0: 11 12 = 0" using the notation in equation
(8), is 4.33 (p-value: 0.0387). The ndings for the model specication in Column 1 in Appendix Table A-3
shows as well that the e¤ect estimates for country-industry groups with strong patent rights di¤er signicantly
more than those for country-industry groups with weaker patent rights. This is in line with our discussion
in Section 3. The F-test statistic for the test of the null hypothesis "N0: (11   12)   (21   22) = 0" is
3.10 (p-value: 0.0796).
39The industry "Chemicals incl. Pharmaceuticals", ranking at the 75th percentile, is included in the high
patent relevance group. Note that this was not the case in the working paper version of our paper (see
Aghion, Howitt and Prantl, 2013a).
40The reform e¤ect estimates for the industries with high and low patent relevance in countries with strong
patent rights di¤er signicantly according to F-test results (p-value: 0.0240), and those for the industries
with intermediate and low patent relevance di¤er at the 10%-signicance level (p-value: 0.0546).
41Signicant e¤ect variation across industries in countries with weaker patent rights is not apparent in a
more exible model specication (see column 2 in Appendix Table A-3).
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medium values, rather than low values.
From column 3 onwards, we use model specications with an additional product market
reform term that is specic to one single industry in countries with strong patent protection,
namely, the industry covering electrical, medical and optical equipment, including computing
machinery, radio, television, and (tele)communication equipment (codes 30 to 33 of 1993
NACE, revision 1).42 Separating that industry out allows us to relate our work to the
empirical literature documenting patenting-related specicities of that industry. Galasso and
Schankerman (2013) recently reported that invalidations of US patents have a signicantly
positive impact on subsequent patent citations in technology elds related to industry NACE
30-33 (electrical equipment and electronics, computers and communications, and medical
instruments incl. biotechnology), but not in other examined elds. They state that the
relevance of invalidation for subsequent citations is suggestive of patent rights blocking follow-
on innovation in these elds which are classied as complex technology elds (see Levin,
Klevorick, Nelson and Winter, 1987, and Cohen et al., 2000). Using EU patent data, Von
Graevenitz, Wagner and Harho¤ (2011) provide empirical support for the view that patent
thickets are more prevalent in the industry NACE 30-33 than in other industries.43
For the extended model specications, for example in columns 3 and 4, we nd small
and insignicant estimates of the coe¢ cient on the product market reform term specic to
the industry NACE 30-33 in countries with strong patent rights. Accordingly, the respective
reform e¤ect is not signicantly di¤erent from the reform e¤ect in industries in countries
42Here, we follow a very helpful suggestion of one of our referees and single that industry out, excluding
it from the other country-industry groups. In Columns 1 and 2, the industry NACE 30-33 is, instead, part
of the respective country-industry groups with highest patent relevance.
43They measure the density of patent thickets in the thirty technology areas covered by the patent system,
and the seven technologies where their measures, the mean triple number, scores highest can all be linked
to the industry NACE 30-33 in our data: audiovisual technology, telecommunications, semiconductors,
information technology, optics, electrical machinery and electrical energy, engines, pumps and turbines (see
Table 1, von Graevenitz et al., 2011). The mean triple number is a technology-specic count of potential
blocking relationships among rms which is identied from patent citations, specically X and Y references
in search reports of the European Patent O¢ ce. Type X or Y references refer to prior art documents, which
call the novelty or the inventive step of a patent claim into question. A triple is dened as a set of patent links
where three rms mutually hold patents limiting new patents of each other according to X or Y references.
See also von Graevenitz et al. (2013), as well as Hall (2005) and Hall and Ziedonis (2001).
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with weaker patent rights, reected by the estimates of the coe¢ cient on the Rcit-term. The
estimates on the coe¢ cients of the other interaction terms again speak to a complemen-
tarity between the competition-increasing product market reform and patent protection in
increasing R&D intensity. These results indicate that our main ndings do not relate to the
particular industry NACE 30-33 for which it has repeatedly been reported that phenom-
ena like patent thickets and other patent-related impediments to cumulative innovation have
been prevalent during our observation period. Expressed otherwise, our main ndings are not
driven by that industry where incumbent rms may be particularly prone to increase their
R&D expenditures after the competition-increasing product market reform for the purpose
of rent-seeking activities, like building up patent thickets via strategic patenting.
In columns 5 and 6, we use our alternative patent relevance measure to address the
following concern regarding our main measure based on pre-sample US patent intensity: rms
in an industry characterized by high product complexity and cumulative innovation may have
to take out many more patents to protect the technology in a single product or process, and
any such patent may be harder to enforce, than in other industries. For constructing the
alternative measure we build on Cohen et al. (2000) who use survey responses of R&D unit
or laboratory managers to classify US industries according to the importance of patenting
in appropriating returns to invention in the years 1991 to 1993. The estimates that we show
in columns 5 and 6, as well as all the relevant test results, are in line with the empirical
ndings when using our main measure of patent relevance.
Overall, we provide a large set of empirical results that is suggestive of a complementarity
between the strength of patent rights and the competition-enhancing product market reform
in inducing innovation. First, we nd a positive average reform e¤ect on R&D intensity in
industries of countries with strong patent rights since the pre-sample period up to 1986, not
in industries of countries with weaker patent rights. Second, we observe that this positive
e¤ect is more pronounced in industries where patenting is more important for innovators than
in other industries, except for the industry where patent thickets and other patenting-related
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impediments to cumulative innovation are most likely to be prevalent.
5.3 Extensions
In addition to R&D intensity, we also consider alternative measures of innovation. First, we
explain real R&D expenditures in order to show that our previous ndings do not just reect
value added responding to the product market reform (Table 6, columns 1, 2 and 3). Second,
we explain the number of patents (Table 6, columns 4, 5 and 6).44 We nd a positive e¤ect
of the competition-increasing product market reform on real R&D expenditures, as well as
on the number of patents, in industries located in countries where patent rights are strong
since the pre-sample period (Table 6, columns 1 and 4).45 In country-industries with weaker
patent rights we observe no such e¤ects. These results are in line with the ndings for the
R&D intensity models in Table 4. As in the R&D intensity models in column 3 of Table 5, we
observe, in countries with strong patent rights, that the increase of real R&D expenditures in
response to the product market reform is more pronounced in industries with high or medium
rather than low patent relevance (Table 6, column 3), and the results are qualitatively similar
in column 2 of Table 5.46 Our main empirical ndings are also stable in patent count models
(Table 6, columns 5 and 6).
A lingering concern with our estimation results so far, is that these might be inuenced
by di¤erent mechanisms causing similar heterogeneity in the e¤ects of the competition-
increasing product market reform across countries, as well as across industries. In particular,
the reform may increase innovation more in industries of countries with initially more devel-
oped nancial sectors than in industries of other countries given that rms need to nance
44The patent count models are estimated on a smaller sample with the a shorter time horizon 1987 to
1999, namely the period for which patent data are available to us. As including country-year xed e¤ects
and industry-year xed e¤ects is straightforward then, we estimate linear probability models (Wooldridge,
2010).
45The F-test statistic relevant to the R&D expenditure model is 4.69 (p-value: 0.0316) and the one relevant
to the patent model is 3.13 (p-value: 0.0783).
46In column 2 of Table 5 the di¤erence between the positive e¤ects for the two country-industry groups
specic to countries with strong patent rights is not statistically signicant. Note also that the results in
columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 are robust when using model specications with a control for real value added,
that is, value added in US dollar puchasing power parities at year 2000 prices. In addition, the results are
also stable if we use the extended sets of explanatory variables as in Columns 3 to 6 of Table 5.
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their innovative investments. And the relevance of high nancial sector development might
be disproportionately larger in those industries where capital needs tend, in general, to be
higher than in other industries.
To account for this concern, we extend the two model specications of columns 3 and 4 in
Table 5. These include the so far most exible sets of interactions between the competition-
increasing product market reform intensity and patenting-related country-industry groups,
and we now add interactions between the reform intensity and nancing-related country-
industry groups. To construct the nancing-related groups, we rst separate between coun-
tries with high and low nancial sector development. The distinguishing indicator is set
equal to one if private credit use and stock market capitalization during the 1980s, relative
to gross domestic product (GDP), rank above the relevant sample median, and otherwise
zero.47 Second, we group industries according to the industry-specic capital needs, proxied
by a measure of capital intensity in the corresponding US industries in the pre-sample period
between 1980 and 1986.48 We rst divide industries into two groups: the group of indus-
tries above the median level of the capital needs measure, and the complementing group
of industries below the median. Alternatively, we divide industries into three groups: the
group with high capital needs covering the industries at or above the 75th percentile of the
capital needs measure, the group of industries below the 25th percentile, and the group of
all intermediate industries.
In column 1 of Table 7, we extend the model specication corresponding to column 3 in
Table 5 by adding the interaction term between the reform intensity and the indicator for in-
dustries with above median capital needs in countries with high development of the nancial
sector, Rcit G(D (Financial development )highc; 1980 90; N (Capital needs)>medianUS; i; ps ), and by also
adding the complementing interaction term. The coe¢ cient estimates on these nancing-
related reform terms are positive, and the one specic to industries with above median capital
47The data is taken from the November 2010 version of the Financial Development and Structure Database
(Beck, Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine, 2000 and 2010b). See Appendix B for details.
48The proxy is based on data from the EU KLEMS database. See Appendix B for details.
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needs in countries with high nancial development is signicantly di¤erent from zero (p-value:
0.0513). These results are in line with the view that high development of a countrys nan-
cial sector enhances the innovation response to the competition-enhancing product market
reform, especially in industries with high capital needs. In line with our previous main nd-
ings, the response of R&D intensity to the reform is positive in the country-industry group
with strong patent rights and above median patent relevance, excluding the industry NACE
30-33, and the e¤ect for that group is higher than the e¤ects for the other patenting-related
country-industry groups.49
In column 2 of Table 7, we extend the model specication of column 4 in Table 5 by
adding three interactions: namely, the interactions between the reform intensity and the
indicators for industries with high, medium or low capital needs in countries with high
nancial development. Again, we nd, for countries with strong patent rights, that R&D
intensity responds more positively to the competition-enhancing product market reform in
industries with high or medium patent relevance, excluding the industry NACE 30-33, than
in industries with low patent relevance.50 The coe¢ cient estimates on the nancing-related
interaction terms show a size pattern which is in line with the ndings in column 1 of
Table 7, but these estimates, as well as the di¤erences between them, are not signicant at
conventional levels of statistical signicance.
The innovation response to the competition-increasing product market reform may also
depend in a di¤erent way upon nancing-related initial conditions of country-industries. To
take that possibility into account, we extend the two model specications of columns 3 and 4
of Table 5 as follows. First, we add a measure of the pre-sample capital intensity per country-
industry, Capital intensityci; ps. Second, we add the interaction of the reform intensity with
49It is signicantly higher than the positive e¤ect for the country-industry group with lower patent relevance
(F-test statistic: 3.28, p-value: 0.07) or the one specic to the industry NACE 30-33 (F-test statistic: 5.74,
p-value: 0.02), and it is signicantly higher than the e¤ect for countries with weaker patent rights, reected
by the coe¢ cient on the Rcit-term.
50The F-test statistic relevant to the comparison involving the country-industry group with strong patent
rights and high patent relevance is 4.02 (p-value: 0.0462). The other relevant F-test statistic is 3.29 (p-value:
0.0711).
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the indicator for those country-industries where the pre-sample capital intensity is above the
sample median, Rcit G(Capital intensity>medianci; ps ). The coe¢ cient estimates on both these
terms turn out to remain insignicant in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7.
To consider that the innovation response to the competition-increasing product market
reform may depend on the initial exposure of country-industries to trade within the EU, and,
thus, to initial competition at the level of the EU-internal market, we add two further terms
in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7. The rst one is the ratio of the value of exports and imports
involving EU 15 member countries as trading partners relative to the value of domestic
production output per country-industry in 1988, EU-internal trade exposureci; 1988.51 The
second one is the interaction of the reform intensity with the indicator for those country-
industries where the initial EU-internal trade exposure is above the sample median, Rcit 
G(EU-internal trade exposure >medianci; 1988 ). While the coe¢ cient estimates on the level term
remain insignicant, those on the interaction term are signicantly negative at the 10-percent
signicance level. The latter nding is in line with the view that country-industries which
were more exposed to trade within the EU before the reform, and, thus, to competition
at the level of the EU internal market, have been more likely to be in an unleveled state
where Schumpeterian e¤ects can arise. Most importantly, adding the four nancing- and
trade-related terms in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 does not challenge our main empirical
ndings.
Finally, we modify the data variation which we use to identify the e¤ects of the competition-
increasing product market reform on innovation, by reducing or extending the estimation
sample. So far, we have mainly used data variation within 11 countries that implemented the
SMP product market reform in 1992 in combination with variation between these countries
and six other countries. If instead we use the data for the 11 initial SMP countries only,
51We use trade data from the October 2011 version of the OECD STAN Bilateral Trade Database (BTD)
for 1988 as this is the earliest year for which we have the relevant trade data, although not for all country-
industries in our main sample (see also Appendix B.6). The group of the EU 15 member states covers
the eleven SMP countries in Table 1, Finland and Sweden, all of which are in our main sample. The two
non-sampled EU 15 member states are Luxembourg and Austria.
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our main empirical results turn out to be stable (see Appendix Table A-4, column 1, panels
A and B). Accordingly, our main empirical ndings hinge neither on including or excluding
the Nordic countries (Finland, Sweden), nor the former planned economies (Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic). As a further concern may arise in relation to lower-
income SMP countries, we re-estimate our main model specications on those initial SMP
countries in our sample that are not in the lowest tercile of the real per capita GDP sample
distribution, which excludes Greece and Portugal. In these regressions, our main empirical
ndings hold up as well (see Appendix Table A-4, column 2). While the focus of the SMP
as implemented in 1992 was on increasing competition, as well as innovation and economic
growth, within the EU internal market, market size expansions followed subsequently. As
increases in market size can have direct e¤ects on innovation (see Acemoglu and Linn, 2004,
among others), we re-estimate our main model specications on the sample where expansion-
related e¤ects are least likely to be relevant. This is the sub-sample, covering the initial SMP
countries in our main sample, but neither Germany which enlarged due to German reunica-
tion nor Belgium for which we have no data before 1992, and covering only the years before
1995, as Finland and Sweden joined the EU, and the SMP, in that year. The coe¢ cient
estimates in column 3 of Appendix Table A-4, as well as the relevant F-test results, are
consistent with our main empirical ndings despite the substantially smaller sample.
Next, we address the issue that the implementation of the SMP in 1992 coincided closely
with changes of the xed European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) which was introduced
in 1979. The ERM perturbations at the beginning of the 1990s related to the ERM entry
of the UK in October 1990, the German currency e¤ectively serving as the base currency
of the ERM, the German Bundesbank tightening monetary policy in response to German
reunication which succeeded the unexpected fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, and
the ERM exit of the UK in September 1992. If we eliminate the two pivotal countries,
Germany and UK, from the estimation sample, our main empirical ndings remain stable
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(see Appendix Table A-5, column 1).52 When we instead extend the estimation sample,
again our main results remain stable. First, we add the US, a large non-European country
with high innovative potential and, second, we enlarge the sample substantially by adding 8
service industries (Table A-5, columns 2 and 3).53 Finally, the main ndings are stable when
re-estimating on the 47 samples that result if we exclude individual industries, countries or
years one by one.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we provided empirical evidence to the e¤ect that strong patent rights may
complement competition-increasing product market reforms in inducing innovation. First, we
found that the product market reform induced by the large-scale internal market reform of the
European Union (EU) in 1992 enhanced innovation in industries that are located in countries
where patent rights are strong, but not in industries of countries where patent rights are weak.
Second, the positive innovation response to the product market reform was more pronounced
in industries in which innovators rely more on patenting than in other industries, except for
one industry where patent thickets and other patent-related impediments to cumulative
innovation are most likely to exist (electrical, medical and optical equipment, including
computing machinery, radio, television, and (tele)communication equipment, NACE 30-33).
The complementarity between patent protection and product market competition can
be rationalized using a Schumpeterian growth model with step-by-step innovation in which
product market competition encourages rms to innovate in order to escape competition.
In such a model, better patent protection prolongs the period over which the rm escaping
competition by innovating, actually enjoys higher monopoly rents from its technological
upgrade.
Our analysis has implications for the long-standing policy debate on the need for and
52Note that our main model specications already include controls for arbitrary country-specic trends of
innovation over time.
53Note that the product market reform intensity is always equal to zero in the US, as well as in service
industries.
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the design of patent systems. Complementarity of patent protection with competition in
product markets, as well as with competition-enhancing product market interventions, should
be taken into account when assessing the e¤ects of patent policies. More generally, our
work provides support for the importance of interaction e¤ects between di¤erent types of
institutions and policies in the growth process.
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Figures and Tables
Figure 1: Patent rights, product market reforms and innovation
- A first look at the raw data -
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Notes: In this figure we show the relation between the competition-increasing product market reform and
innovation in countries with strong patent protection since the pre-sample period (left graph) and in countries
with weaker patent protection (right graph). The horizontal axes refer to our measure of product market
reform intensity, the vertical axes to R&D intensity and the circles indicate all 2,483 country-industry-year
data points between the fifth and the ninety-fifth percentile of the R&D intensity distribution in our main
sample on 13 manufacturing industries in 17 European countries between 1987 and 2003. Each of these lines
represents a linear prediction from a country group-specific linear regression of R&D intensity on product
market reform intensity as the sole explanatory variable.
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Table 1: Patent protection per country
Adoption Patent protection index
of strong patent 1985 1990 1995 2000
protection
EU member states with SMP product market reform in 1992
BEL (Belgium) early 4.0917 4.3417 4.5417 4.6667
DNK (Denmark) early 3.6333 3.8833 4.5417 4.6667
FRA (France) early 3.7583 3.8833 4.5417 4.6667
GER (Germany) early 3.8417 3.9667 4.1667 4.5000
GRC (Greece) late 2.3250 2.8667 3.4667 3.9667
IRL (Ireland) late 2.2000 2.3250 4.1417 4.6667
ITA (Italy) early 3.6833 4.0083 4.3333 4.6667
NLD (Netherlands) early 3.7667 4.2167 4.5417 4.6667
PRT (Portugal) late 1.6657 1.6657 3.3490 4.0050
ESP (Spain) late 2.8080 3.5583 4.2083 4.3333
UK (United Kingdom) early 3.8833 4.3417 4.5417 4.5417
European countries outside EU until 1995
FIN (Finland) late 3.3083 3.3083 4.4167 4.5417
SWE (Sweden) early 3.4833 3.8833 4.4167 4.5417
European countries outside EU during observation period
CZE (Czech Republic) late n.a. n.a. 2.9583 3.2083
HUN (Hungary) late n.a. n.a. 4.0417 4.0417
POL (Poland) late n.a. n.a. 3.4583 3.9167
SVK (Slovak Republic) late n.a. n.a. 2.9583 2.7583
Non-European countries (not in main estimation sample)
US (United States) early 4.6750 4.6750 4.8750 4.8750
Notes: In column 2, we indicate whether a sampled country adopted strong patent protection
early or late in time, distinguishing between countries that fell under the large-scale, EU-internal
product market reform, the EU Single Market Program (SMP), and those that didn’t. Countries
with strong patent rights since the pre-sample period, 1980 to 1986, are classified as early adopters.
Countries with weaker patent rights are late adopters, completing their reforms relevant to a strong
patent protection regime in 1992, or even later. For comparison, columns 3 to 6 provide information
on the patent protection index by Park (2008) and Ginarte and Park (1997); it takes values between
zero and five and higher values indicate stronger patent protection. The term ‘n.a.’ indicates a
missing index value.
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Table 2: Patent relevance and product market reform per industry
Patent relevance Product market
reform
Industry Ranking 1 Ranking 2 Share in 1992
rank (group) rank (group) (s.e.)
15-16: food, beverages, and tobacco low low 0.3075
(0.1201)
17-19: textiles, leather, and footwear low low 0.5727
(0.1281)
23: coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel medium high 0.0000
(0.0000)
24: chemicals including pharmaceuticals high high 0.7227
(0.1311)
25: rubber and plastics medium medium 0.4675
(0.1292)
26: other non-metallic mineral products medium medium 0.5455
(0.1623)
27: basic metals low low 0.0749
(0.1536)
28: fabricated metal products medium medium 0.3409
(0.1776)
29: general & special purpose machinery n.e.c., high high 0.7409
engines, turbines & domestic appliances (0.1020)
n.e.c., machine tools, weapons
30-33: electrical, medical & optical equipment high medium 0.7112
incl. computing machinery, radio, television (0.0489)
and (tele)communication equipment
34: motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers medium high 0.6970
(0.1798)
35: other transport equipment medium medium 0.4659
(0.1590)
36-37: furniture, jewelery, games & toys, high medium 0.4545
sports goods, recycling (0.0934)
Notes: In column 2 of this table, we provide the industry-specific patent relevance ranking based on the US patent
intensity data for the pre-sample period, 1980 to 1986, and in column 3 the ranking based on Cohen, Nelson and
Walsh (2000). In column 4, we show the product market reform intensity in 1992 in the sampled 13 two-digit
industries, averaged across the 11 countries that fell under the product market reform of the SMP (see Table
1). The measure is set to zero in all years before the implementation of the reform, from 1992 onwards it takes
a positive value in country-industries that were ex ante expected to be affected by the reform, otherwise zero.
Country-industries with higher values were expected to be affected more than others.
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Table 3: Baseline models explaining R&D intensity
Dependent variable: R&D intensitycit
OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables:
Product market reformcit 0.0352*** 0.0356***
(0.0099) (0.0099)
Patent protectionct 0.0003 0.0027
(0.0062) (0.0061)
Country effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,761 2,761 2,761
Notes: In this table we provide OLS estimates of basic models explaining R&D intensity
in our main sample, the unbalanced panel of 2,761 observations on 13 manufacturing
industries in 17 European countries between 1987 and 2003.
R&D intensitycit is defined as R&D expenditures over value added. The product market
reform intensity, Product market reformcit, equals zero in all years before the implemen-
tation of the SMP, from 1992 onwards it takes positive values up to 1 with higher values
for country-industries that were ex ante expected to be affected more by the SMP than
others. The measure Patent protectionct is coded one in the years once a country com-
pleted its reforms preparing the ground for a strong patent protection regime, and zero
otherwise.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted corre-
lation between annual observations within country-industries. Statistical significance at
the 1% level is indicated by ***.
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Table 4: Main models explaining R&D intensity: Part 1
Dependent variable: R&D intensitycit
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables:
Rcit*G(P (Protection)
strong
c, ps ) 0.0525*** 0.0870*** 0.0885*** 0.0807***
(0.0115) (0.0229) (0.0241) (0.0202)
Rcit*G(P
weak
c, ps ) 0.0074
(0.0125)
Rcit*Protection
Ginarte/Park
ct 0.0482*** 0.1206***
(0.0162) (0.0344)
R (Product market reform)cit -0.0060 -0.0065 0.0070 -0.1466** -0.4467***
(0.0219) (0.0220) (0.0170) (0.0676) (0.1437)
Knowledge stockci,1986 -0.0008 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0002
(0.0037) (0.0045) (0.0037) (0.0033)
Country-year effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country effects Yes No No No No No
Industry effects Yes No No No No No
Year effects Yes No No No No No
Weak identification test:
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 34,236 [1]
Statistic
Observations 2,761 2,761 2,761 1,992 2,761 2,761
Notes: In this table we provide OLS and IV estimates of R&D intensity models for our main sample, the
unbalanced panel of 2,761 observations on 13 manufacturing industries in 17 European countries between
1987 and 2003.
R&D intensitycit is defined as R&D expenditures over value added. In all columns except for column 4,
we measure the product market intensity, Rcit, using our main reform measure. It is equal to zero in all
years before the implementation of the SMP, from 1992 onwards it takes positive values up to 1 with higher
values for country-industries that were ex ante expected to be affected more by the SMP than others. In
column 4, we use the alternative reform measure (see Section 4 for details).
Country groups are indicated by G(·). The group G(P strongc, ps ) covers the countries where patent protection is
strong since the pre-sample period, indicated by P (Protection)strongc, ps . The group G(P
weak
c, ps ) complements.
The measure ProtectionGPct is the patent protection index of Ginarte and Park (1997) and Park (2008).
In column 5, we exclude the instrument Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps ). The number of first stage equations is given in
brackets at the bottom of column 5.
The variable Knowledge stockci,1986 is the patent-based knowledge stock per country-industry in 1986.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation between annual
observations within country-industries. Statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level is indicated by ***
and **.
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Table 5: Main models explaining R&D intensity: Part 2
Dependent variable: R&D intensitycit
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables:
Rcit*G(P (Protection)
strong
c, ps , 0.1205*** 0.1124*** 0.0755***
I (Patent relevance)> medianUS, i, ps ) (0.0267) (0.0258) (0.0218)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
≤ median
US, i, ps ) 0.0682*** 0.0597** 0.0495*
(0.0250) (0.0245) (0.0276)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
high
US, i, ps) 0.0623** 0.0742*** 0.0527***
(0.0261) (0.0259) (0.0198)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
medium
US, i, ps) 0.0590** 0.0550** 0.0559
(0.0270) (0.0269) (0.0387)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
low
US, i, ps) 0.0081 0.0034 -0.0005
(0.0237) (0.0244) (0.0247)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , NACE 30-33i) 0.0029 -0.0137 -0.0092 -0.0171
(0.0393) (0.0384) (0.0386) (0.0383)
R (Product market reform)cit -0.0060 -0.0045 -0.0073 -0.0069 -0.0029 -0.0068
(0.0208) (0.0198) (0.0196) (0.0188) (0.0195) (0.0184)
Knowledge stockci, 1986 -0.0022 -0.0052 -0.0068 -0.0090* -0.0083* -0.0102**
(0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0047)
Controls for all G(*)ci-groups Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,761 2,761 2,761 2,761 2,761 2,761
Notes: In this table we provide OLS estimates of R&D intensity models for the main sample as described
in Table 4).
Country-industry groups are indicated by G(·). In Column 1, we divide all industries in the country group
with strong pre-sample patent protection (P (Protection)strongc, ps ) into the industry-specific sub-group with
above median patent relevance (I (Patent relevance)US, i, ps), and the complementing group. In Column 2
we use three industry-specific groups for countries with strong patent protection, distinguishing between
high, medium and low patent relevance. In Columns 1 and 2, the industry NACE 30-33 (electrical and
optical equipment including computing machinery, radio, television and (tele)communication equipment)
is part of the respective industry group with highest patent relevance. In columns 3 to 6, we exclude it
from these groups and include, instead, the specific interaction term Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , NACE 30-33i).
In Columns 1 to 4, we use our main patent relevance measure which ranks each industry i based on
US patent intensity data during the pre-sample period, 1980 to 1986. In Columns 5 and 6, we use the
alternative measure, building on Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) who use survey responses of R&D unit
or laboratory managers to classify US industries according to the importance of patenting in appropriating
returns to invention in the years 1991 to 1993.
All other variables are defined as in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered
to allow for unrestricted correlation between annual observations within country-industries. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *.
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Table 6: Models explaining alternative outcome variables
Dependent variables:
Real R&D expenditurescit Number of patentscit
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables:
Rcit*G(P (Protection)
strong
c, ps ) 0.9503** 0.0592*
(0.4061) (0.0320)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , 1.4065*** 0.1245***
I (Patent relevance)≥ medianUS, i, ps ) (0.4411) (0.0473)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
< median
US, i, ps ) 1.0305** 0.0032
(0.4902) (0.0208)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c,ps , I
high
US, i, ps) 1.1586*** 0.1063**
(0.4181) (0.0455)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
medium
US, i, ps) 1.1377** 0.0034
(0.5761) (0.0214)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
low
US, i, ps) 0.1963 -0.0189
(0.2806) (0.0189)
R (Product market reform)cit -0.1711 -0.2725 -0.2290 0.0048 0.0086 0.0092
(0.3002) (0.3033) (0.3178) (0.0245) (0.0245) (0.0242)
Knowledge stockci,1986 0.6337*** 0.6587*** 0.6340*** 0.2711*** 0.2671*** 0.2658***
(0.1370) (0.1423) (0.1433) (0.0155) (0.0163) (0.0164)
Controls for all G(*)ci-groups No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Country-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observation period 87-03 87-03 87-03 87-99 87-99 87-99
Observations 2,761 2,761 2,761 2,031 2,031 2,031
Notes: In this table we provide OLS estimates of models explaining real R&D expenditures for the main
sample as described in Table 4. The OLS estimates of models explaining the number of patents are for
the sub-sample of all 2,031 observations for the years 1987 to 1999.
The variable Real R&D expenditurescit is defined as R&D expenditures in US dollar purchasing power
parities at year 2000 prices (in billion). The measure number of patentscit is a fractional count of patents
taken out per country-industry-year at the US Patent and Trademark Office.
All other variables are defined as in Tables 4 and 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered
to allow for unrestricted correlation between annual observations within country-industries. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *.
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Table 7: Models accounting for alternative explanations
Dependent variable: R&D intensitycit
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)Explanatory Variables:
Rcit*G(D (Financial Development)
high
c, 80−90, 0.0598*
N (Capital needs)> medianUS, i, ps ) (0.0305)
Rcit*G(D
high
c, 80−90, N
≤ median
US, i, ps ) 0.0236
(0.0342)
Rcit*G(D
high
c, 80−90, N
high
US, i, ps) 0.0512
(0.0340)
Rcit*G(D
high
c, 80−90, N
medium
US, i, ps) 0.0223
(0.0289)
Rcit*G(D
high
c, 80−90, N
low
US, i, ps) -0.0088
(0.0616)
Rcit*G(Capital intensity
> median
ci, ps ) -0.0277 -0.0296
(0.0202) (0.0192)
Rcit*G(EU-internal trade exposure
> median
ci, 1988 ) -0.0427* -0.0391*
(0.0243) (0.0232)
Rcit*G(P (Protection)
strong
c, ps , 0.0923*** 0.1203***
I (Patent relevance)> medianUS, i, ps ) (0.0281) (0.0376)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
≤ median
US, i, ps ) 0.0468* 0.0662*
(0.0264) (0.0392)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c,ps , I
high
US, i,ps) 0.0674** 0.0888**
(0.0261) (0.0357)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
medium
US, i,ps ) 0.0642** 0.0523
(0.0286) (0.0411)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
low
US, i,ps) 0.0146 0.0142
(0.0249) (0.0390)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , NACE 30-33i) -0.0054 0.0060 0.0108 -0.0001
(0.0435) (0.0453) (0.0524) (0.0507)
R (Product market reforms)cit -0.0161 -0.0237 0.0047 -0.0050
(0.0220) (0.0195) (0.0424) (0.0400)
Capital intensityci,ps No No Yes Yes
EU-internal trade exposureci,1988 No No Yes Yes
Knowledge stockci,1986 (as in Table 5) Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls for all G(*)ci-groups Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects and industry-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,325 2,325 1,725 1,725
Note: The OLS estimates of the R&D intensity models are for the sub-samples of the main sample in
Table 4 where the relevant financial and trade-related measures are available. Country-industry groups
are indicated by G(·). The variable D (Financial Development)highc, 1980−90 is coded one for all industries in
countries with high financial sector development, and we separate between the industries above the median
of the capital needs measure, N (Capital needs)> med.US, i, ps, and the complementing ones. Alternatively, we
distinguish between industries at or above the 75th percentile (NhighUS, i, ps), below the 25th percentile, and
intermediate ones. In columns 3 and 4, we include 1) the pre-sample capital intensity per country-industry,
Capital intensityci, ps, 2) the interaction of Rcit with the indicator for country-industries above the relevant
median, Rcit*G(Capital intensity
> median
ci, ps ), 3) the ratio of EU 15 exports and imports relative to domestic
production output per country-industry in 1988, EU-internal trade exposureci,1988, and 4) the interaction
of Rcit with the indicator for country-industries above the relevant median, Rcit*G(EU-internal trade
exposure>medianci,1988 ). All other variables, the standard errors in parentheses, and significance levels are as in
Tables 4 and 5. 46
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Appendix A: Additional Tables
Table A-1: Definitions of variables and descriptive statistics
Variable Definition Mean/ Standard
share deviation
R&D intensitycit nominal R&D expenditures divided by nominal 0.0464 0.0734
value added in country c, industry i and year y
Real R&D expenditurescit R & D expenditures in US dollar purchasing power 0.4443 1.1583
parities at year 2000 prices (in billion)
Number of patentscit fractional count of patents taken out in 1000 0.1036 0.3012
in US Patent Office
Product market reformcit share of non-weighted 4-digit classes in country-industry ci 0.3027 0.3076
(main measure Rmcit) that are ex ante expected to be affected by the product
market reform from 1992 onwards; 0: otherwise
Protectionstrongc, ps 1: country c with strong patent rights since 0.5389
the pre-sample period, 1980 to 1986 0: otherwise
Protectionweakc, ps 1: country c with weaker patent protection in the 0.4611
pre-sample period and later on, 0: otherwise
Knowledge stockci, 1986 knowledge stock in country-industry ci in 1986 0.3684 1.0725
(perpetual inventory method, depreciation rate: 20 %)
Patent intensityUS, i, 1982 number of patents divided by nominal value added 0.0496 0.0376
in million US dollar in US-industry i in year 1982
Product market reformcit share of employment-weighted 3-digit classes in 0.2741 0.4062
(alternative measure Racit) country–industry ci that are ex ante expected to be
affected by the reform from 1992 onwards; 0: otherwise
Protection
Ginarte/Park
ct patent protection index (Park, 2008, Ginarte & Park, 3.9029 0.7067
1997) taking values 0 to 5 & higher values in country-
-years ct with patent laws providing stronger IPR
Financial developmentc, ps 1: country c with private credit use and stock market 0.4524
capitalization during the 1980s, relative to gross
domestic product (GDP), above the relevant sample
median distribution, 0: otherwise
Capital needsUS, i, ps capital intensity in US-industry i in the pre-sample period 0.4452 0.3533
EU internal trade ratio of export plus import values involving EU 15 member
exposureci, 1988 countries as trading partners relative to domestic
production output value per country-industry in 1988
Notes: This table provides non-weighted descriptive statistics for our main sample, an unbalanced panel of
2,761 observations on 13 manufacturing industries in 17 European countries between 1987 and 2003, except
for the variable EU internal trade exposureci, 1988 which is reported for the sub-sample of 1,725 observations
as used in columns 3 and 4 of Table 7.
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Table A-2: US patent intensity and patent effectiveness per industry
US patent intensity Patent effectiveness
Industry (1982, nominal) (Cohen, Nelson and
Walsh, 2000)
15-16: food, beverages, and tobacco 0.0037 17.33
17-19: textiles, leather, and footwear 0.0055 22.61
23: coke, refined petroleum, and nuclear fuel 0.3222 35.00
24: chemicals including pharmaceuticals 0.0799 33.73
25: rubber and plastics 0.0673 26.29
26: other non-metallic mineral products 0.0329 24.34
27: basic metals 0.0141 21.41
28: fabricated metal products 0.0545 31.16
29: general & special purpose machinery n.e.c., 0.0846 34.36
engines, turbines & domestic appliances
n.e.c., machine tools, weapons
30-33: electrical, medical & optical equipment 0.1052 28.45
incl. computing machinery, radio, television
and (tele)communication equipment
34: motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 0.0232 33.30
35: other transport equipment 0.0154 27.21
36-37: furniture, jewelery, games & toys, 0.1242 28.77
sports goods, recycling
Notes: In column 2 of this table, we show for each sampled industry the nominal US patent intensity in
1982, one exemplary year of the pre-sample period 1980 to 1986. In column 3, we show the share of product
and process innovations in the years 1991 to 1993 for which R&D unit and laboratory managers judged
patenting to be effective in protecting returns to invention, realized via commercialization or licensing
(Cohen, Nelson and Walsh, 2000).
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Table A-3: Variants to model specifications in Table 5
Dependent variable: R&D intensitycit
OLS OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Explanatory Variables:
R (Product market reforms)cit 0.1163***
*G(P (Protection)strongc, ps , I (Patent relevance)
> med.
US, i, ps) (0.0274)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
≤ median
US, i, ps ) 0.0591**
(0.0228)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
high
US, i, ps) 0.0603** 0.0646** 0.0415**
(0.0290) (0.0285) (0.0208)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
medium
US, i, ps) 0.0521* 0.0460 0.0489
(0.0275) (0.0282) (0.0392)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
low
US, i, ps) 0.0021 -0.0051 -0.0079
(0.0240) (0.0254) (0.0264)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , NACE 30-33i) -0.0007 -0.0036
(0.0446) (0.0450)
Rcit*G(P
weak
c, ps , I
> median
US, i, ps ) -0.0028
(0.0220)
Rcit*G(P
weak
c, ps , I
≤ median
US, i, ps ) -0.0140
(0.0265)
Rcit*G(P
weak
c, ps , I
high
US, i, ps) 0.0001 -0.0144 -0.0161
(0.0234) (0.0228) (0.0203)
Rcit*G(P
weak
c, ps , I
medium
US, i, ps) -0.0111 -0.0128 -0.0067
(0.0245) (0.0242) (0.0275)
Rcit*G(P
weak
c, ps , I
low
US, i, ps) -0.0079 -0.0108 -0.0077
(0.0218) 0.213 (0.0209)
Rcit*G(P
weak
c, ps , NACE 30-33i) 0.0389 -0.0417
(0.0278) (0.0270)
Knowledge stockci,1986 -0.0022 -0.0053 -0.0091* -0.0103**
(0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0049) (0.0047)
Controls for G(*)ci-groups Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,761 2,761 2,761 2,761
Notes: In this table we provide OLS estimates of R&D intensity models for the main sample
as described in Table 4. Country-industry groups are indicated by G(·). In Columns 3 and 4,
G(P (Protection)strongc, ps , NACE 30-33i singles out the industry covering electrical and optical equip-
ment incl. computing machinery, radio, television and (tele)communication equipment in countries
with strong patent protection. In Column 1, we divide all industries in the country group with strong
pre-sample patent protection (Pstrongc, ps ), as well as those in the country group with weaker protection
(Pweakc, ps ), into the industry-specific sub-group with below or at median patent relevance and the sub-
group with above median patent relevance (I (Patent relevance)US, i,ps). In Column 2 we use three
industry-specific groups for each country group, distinguishing between high, medium and low patent
relevance. In Columns 1 and 2, the industry NACE 30-33 is part of the respective industry group
with highest patent relevance. In columns 3 and 4, we exclude it from these groups. We use our main
patent relevance measure in Columns 1 to 3 and we use the alternative measure in Column 4. All
other variables are defined as in Table 4. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered to
allow for unrestricted correlation between annual observations within country-industries. Statistical
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level is indicated by ***, ** and *.
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Table A-4: Identification using alternative sources of data variation: Part 1
Dependent variable: R&D intensitycit
Sample including...
...SMP-countries ...SMP-countries, ...SMP countries, except
only except Greece & Germany and Belgium,
Portugal in years before 1995
Panel A OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables:
R (Product market reforms)cit 0.0775*** 0.0959** 0.0651**
*G(P (Protection)strongc, ps ) (0.0244) (0.0375) (0.0251)
Rcit -0.0109 -0.0625 0.0631
(0.0312) (0.0542) (0.0425)
Knowledge stock control as in Table 4 Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,025 1,698 896
Panel B OLS OLS OLS
(4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables:
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
high
US, i, ps) 0.0745** 0.0905** 0.0313
(0.0299) (0.0385) (0.0235)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
medium
US, i, ps) 0.0559** 0.0666* 0.0771***
(0.0278) (0.0387) (0.0289)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
low
US, i, ps) 0.0106 0.0284 0.0030
(0.0265) (0.0411) (0.0336)
Rcit -0.0148 -0.0511 0.0514
(0.0299) (0.0550) (0.0387)
Controls for the G(*)ci-groups Yes Yes Yes
Knowledge stock control as in Table 4 Yes Yes Yes
Country-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,025 1,698 896
Notes: The R&D-intensity model estimates in panel A of column 1, as well as those for panel B, are
for the sub-sample, resulting after eliminating all non-SMP countries from the main sample, as used in
Table 4. The estimates in column 2 are for the sub-sample of SMP countries that are not in the lowest
tercile of the real per capita GDP sample distribution, excluding Greece and Portugal. For the estimates
in column 3 we use the 30 percent sub-sample of our main sample, covering only EU member countries
that implemented the SMP in 1992, but neither Germany which enlarged due to German reunification
nor Belgium for which we have no data before 1992, and using only observations for years before 1995,
when Finland and Sweden joined the EU, and the SMP.
All explanatory variables are defined as in Tables 4 and 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust and
clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation between annual observations within country-industries.
Statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level is indicated by *** and **.
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Table A-5: Identification using alternative sources of data variation: Part 2
Dependent variable: R&D intensitycit
Main sample...
...without ...plus ...plus
Germany and UK the United States service industries
Panel A OLS OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3)
Explanatory Variables:
R (Product market reforms)cit 0.0894*** 0.0857*** 0.0878***
*G(P (Protection)strongc, ps ) (0.0236) (0.0233) (0.01233)
Rcit 0.0073 -0.0180 0.0020
(0.0192) (0.0228) (0.0133)
Knowledge stock control as in Table 4 Yes Yes n.a.
Country-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,371 2,982 4,030
Panel B OLS OLS OLS
(4) (5) (6)
Explanatory Variables:
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I (Patent relevance)
high
US, i, ps) 0.0640** 0.0583** 0.0529**
(0.0275) (0.0248) (0.0233)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
medium
US, i, ps) 0.0717*** 0.0451* 0.0786***
(0.0270) (0.0261) (0.0213)
Rcit*G(P
strong
c, ps , I
low
US, i, ps) 0.0108 0.0276 0.0101
(0.0261) (0.0253) (0.0150)
Rcit 0.0084 -0.0122 0.0024
(0.0180) (0.0200) (0.0124)
Controls for the G(*)ci-groups Yes Yes Yes
Knowledge stock control as in Table 4 Yes Yes n.a.
Country-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Industry-year effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2,371 2,982 4,030
Notes: The R&D-intensity model estimates in panel A of column 1, as well as those in panel B, are for
the sub-sample, resulting after eliminating Germany and the UK from the main sample, as used in Table
4. The estimates in column 2 are for the extended sample covering all countries in the main sample, plus
the US. For the estimates in column 3 we add data for 8 service industries to the main sample. As patent
data are not available for service industries, the model specifications in column 3 lack the patent-based
knowledge stock control variable.
All explanatory variables are defined as in Tables 4 and 5. Standard errors in parentheses are robust
and clustered to allow for unrestricted correlation between annual observations within country-industries.
Statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level is indicated by *** and **.
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